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NO IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE
NATIONAL HOUSING ACT: A BARRIER TO A
STATUTORY RIGHT
Unfit housing constitutes a major problem for low-income resi-
dents of federally-assisted dwellings.' The problem is especially se-
vere in states where local law does not impose a duty to repair upon
either private or public landlords.' The United States Housing Act of
19371, the first of many federal programs4 enacted to address the dif-
1. For a discussion of the problems faced by tenants of public housing see Fuerst
and Petty, Public Housing in the Courts; Pyrrhic Victoriesfor the Poor, 9 URB. LAW.
496 (1977) (a discussion of less than favorable treatment by courts of public housing
issues); Kargman, An Analysis of Landlord-Tenant Disputes in Subsidized Housing, 17
URBAN L. ANN. 227 (1979) (expectations of public housing tenants and the problems
faced by tenants in the courts); and Steinberg, Adequate Housing for Al: Myth or
Reality?, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 63 (1975) (discussion of ineffective remedies for substan-
dard housing and a plea for a constitutional right to fit housing).
2. The general common law rule regarding habitability of leased property holds
that absent fraud or concealment by the landlord, the landlord neither impliedly war-
rants that the leased premises are fit for habitation nor has a duty to repair and main-
tain the property. See generally I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.11, 3.45, 3.51
(AJ. Casner ed. 1952); and W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 63 (3d ed. 1965). In recent
years, many jurisdictions have imposed by statute or by judicial decision some duty
on the landlord to provide the tenant with habitable premises. The developing doc-
trine of implied warranty is discussed at length in Cunningham, The New Impliedand
Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases From Contract to Status, 16
URBAN L. ANN. 3 (1979). As many as thirty-one states now afford tenants of both
public and private landlords some degree of protection from unfit leased housing. .d.
at 6-9. The remaining states continue to adhere to some form of the common law
rule. In a recent decision, Alexander v. HUD, 441 U.S. 39 (1979), the Supreme Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision refusing to imply a warranty
of habitability in lease agreements where HUD was the leasor. For a critical discus-
sion of the Seventh Circuit opinion and the general law of implied warranties see
Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Federal Housing Projects: Alexander v.
United States Department f Housing and Urban Development, 19 B.C. L. REv. 343
(1978); and Note, Landlord-Tenant-Government Housing-Implied Warranty of Habit-
abiliyP--A Warranty of Habitability is Not Implied in Leases ofFederally Owned Public
Housing-Alexander v. HUD, 12 GA. L. REv. 120 (1977). See also Abbott, Housing
Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1976)
(a detailed look at the rights and remedies at common law, under statute, and by
implication to enforce decent housing),
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437g (1976).
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ficulties attending the provision of low-income housing,' has as its
express purpose the assistance of states and local authorities in reme-
dying the "acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings"6
for low-income families.7 The Act authorizes the local authority to
exercise its own discretion in project operations to accomplish this
purpose."
The relationship between the local authority and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is governed by an An-
nual Contributions Contract (ACC)9 ffied with HUD." Though
4. The sheer volume of federal programs dealing with housing places a general
discussion beyond the scope of this Comment. For general histories of federal in-
volvement in housing, see A. DowNs, URBAN PROBLEMS & PROSPECTS 87-146 (1976)
(a survey and evaluation of federal housing programs between 1960-1974); L. FRIED-
MAN, GOVERNMENT & SLUM HoUsING (1969) (history of federal housing legislation
from the 1930s through the 1960s); URBAN AMEmCA POLIcIEs & PROBLEMS (1978)
(general survey of major urban issues and legislation between 1973-1977).
5. The United States Housing Act defines "low-income housing" to mean "de-
cent, safe, and sanitary dwellings within the financial reach of families of low income,
and embraces all necessary appurtenances thereto." 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(l) (1976). In-
come limits for participation are set by the local authority with HUD approval; rental
is not to exceed one-fourth of family income. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). Similar policy statements are found in related housing
statutes. See Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). The 1949 statute's de-
clared purpose is the elimination of "substandard and other inadequate housing,"
setting as a national goal "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family." Id. Congress reaffirmed this policy in the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1701t and 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1976), stating
that programs under the act purport to "assist families with incomes so low that they
could not otherwise decently house themselves." Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(2) (1976). The Act defines "low income families" as families
lacking the financial capacity to pay enough to motivate private enterprise in their
locality or metropolitan area to construct a sufficient supply of "decent, safe, and
sanitary dwellings" for their residence.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). See S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong,, 2d Sess. 44, reprinted
i [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4314. See also note 10 infra.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1437c (1976). The ACC serves as a contract between the local
housing authority and HUD guaranteeing payment by the latter to the former and
specifying any conditions which must be fulfilled for funding.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (1976). The Secretary has authorization to include in the
ACC those covenants and conditions deemed necessary "to insure the low-income
character of the project involved." Id. § 1437d(a). The contract requirements must
include "the establishment of effective tenant-management relationships designed to
assure that satisfactory standards of tenant security and project maintenance are for-
mulated and that the public housing agency. . . enforces those standards fully and
effectively." Id. § 1437d(c)(4)(C). The power of HUD to impose management re-
quirements is tempered by the statute's policy of giving local agencies broad opera-
[Vol. 22:249
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IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION
HUD has statutory remedies available for violation of the Act or the
ACC," tenants have no express private right of action to seek relief.
In a recent decision, Perry v. Housing Authori City of Charleston,12 a
United States district court declined to find an implied cause of ac-
tion in the Housing Act. As a result, the court denied tenants of a
low-income project federal jurisdiction to redress alleged indecent,
unsafe, and unsanitary conditions at the project.
In Perry, public housing tenants brought a class action suit1 3
against the local housing authority for failure to maintain the project
in accordance with the United States Housing Act, 14 the ACC,15 and
tional discretion. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 44, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4314, 4314.
The Senate Report states that the public housing authority has the right to make
management decisions subject only to basic guidance from HUD regulations. The
report suggests that the regulations should conform to the "letter and spirit" of the
statute and should comply with the policy of vesting "as much decision making as
possible" in local, as opposed to federal, authorities. The Report warns that HUD
.'regulations abrogating the local decision making power" will be viewed with dis-
favor. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(g) (1976).
[U]pon the occurrence of a substantial default in respect to the covenants or con-
ditions to which the public housing agency is subject (as such substantial default
shall be defined in such contract), the public housing agency shall be obligated at
the option of the Secretary either to convey title in any case where, in the deter-
mination of the Secretary (which determination shall be final and conclusive),
such conveyance of title is necessary to achieve the purposes of this chapter, or to
deliver to the Secretary possession of the project, as then constituted, to which
such contract relates. (emphasis added).
Id. § 1437d(g)(1). Upon remedying the defaulting condition, the housing authority is
allowed to resume control. Id. § 1437d(g)(2).
12. 486 F. Supp. 498 (D. S.C. 1980).
13. Four named plaintiffs brought suit individually and on behalf of all other
residents of the George Legare Homes of Charleston, South Carolina. Plaintiffs re-
quested that the court take jurisdiction over the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a)
(1976), which provides for original jurisdiction when an action arises under any act
regulating commerce. 486 F. Supp. at 500. Alternate bases for jurisdiction are dis-
cussed in note 21 infra.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976). plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that the lo-
cal housing agency was in violation of the Act and that plaintiffs were third party
beneficiaries under the Act and ACC. Plaintiffs also sought an injunction under 28
U.S.C. § 2202 (1976) to require defendants to restore and maintain the project in a
habitable condition, and requested the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
damage claims, including recovery of 35% of rents paid. 486 F. Supp. at 499.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437(a)(1), (2). See notes 5-7 and accompanying textsupra.
15. Section 201 of the ACC entered into by defendant housing authority requires
the authority at all times to operate the project:
1981]
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HUD regulations.' 6 Plaintiffs, alleging the project's condition im-
paired the health and well-being of project residents, 17 predicated
their federal right of action on their status as the prime beneficiaries
of the housing program.'"
The district court refused to infer a federal cause of action solely
on the basis of plaintiffs' membership in the class especially benefited
(1) solely for the purpose of providing a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling.. .
within the reach of families of low income;
(2) in such a manner as to promote serviceability, efficiency, economy, and sta-
bility; and
(3) in such a manner as to achieve the economic well-being of the tenants
thereof.
TERMs AND CONDITIONS CONSTITUTING PART Two OF A CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL
CONTRIBUTIONS CONTRACT BETWEEN LOCAL AUTHORITY AND THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, HUD-53011 §§ 201 and 209(2), Nov. 1969. Section 209(2) also requires
the local authority to maintain the project in good repair, order, and condition. Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 1545, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1937).
16. HUD regulations pursuant to the Act require all tenant leases to include the
following obligations of the local housing authority:
(I) To maintain the premises and the project in decent, safe, and sanitary con-
dition;
(2) To comply with requirements of applicable building codes, housing codes,
and HUD regulations materially affecting health and safety;
(3) To make necessary repairs to the premises;
(4) To keep project buildings, facilities and common areas, not otherwise as-
signed to the tenant for maintenance and upkeep, in a clean and safe condition;
(5) To maintain in good and safe working order and condition electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and other facilities and appliances, in-
cluding elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by the PHA;
(6) To provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and facilities (except con-
tainers for the exclusive use of an individual tenant family) for the deposit of
ashes, garbage, rubbish and other waste removed from the premises by the tenant
in accordance with paragraph (f)(7) of this section; and
(7) To supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water and reason-
able amounts of heat at appropriate times of the year (according to local custom
and usage) except where the building that includes the dwelling unit is not re-
quired by law to be equipped for that purpose, or where heat or hot water is
generated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant and sup-
plied by a direct utility connection.
24 C.F.R. § 866.4(e) (1980).
17. 486 F. Supp. at 500. Plaintiffs alleged in part that the project was unfit due to
the presence of lead based paint, the deterioration of floors and roofing, inadequate
lighting and security, insufficient heating, total neglect of the grounds and roads, and
failure of the authority to provide routine garbage collection which allowed vermin to
infest the project area. Id.
18. Id. at 501.
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by the legislation.' 9 The court stressed the necessity of finding ex-
press language in the statute or its legislative history indicating con-
gressional intent to create such an action.2" Discovering no such
indication in the Housing Act's legislative materials, the court dis-
missed the action for failure to state a justiciable claim.2"
Implied private causes of action22 derive from statutory construc-
19. Id. at 502. The court reached this conclusion by applying the test from Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (discussed in notes 27-28 and accompanying text infra) in
light of more recent Supreme Court decisions. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979) and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979), discussed in notes 41-61 and accompanying text infra.
20. 486 F. Supp. at 502.
21. When a claimant seeks jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976) the thresh-
old question is whether or not Congress enacted the statute forming the basis of the
action under the federal commerce power. The court in Perry found this requirement
to be met after reviewing the legislative history of the original statute. 486 F. Supp. at
500-501. But see Potrero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Auth. of the
City and County of San Francisco, 410 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding the
Housing Act is welfare legislation for the purposes of§ 1337 and has only an inciden-
tal effect on commerce).
Courts have further required that a party claiming § 1337 jurisdiction present a
federal claim independent from the commerce power. 486 F. Supp. at 500 and cases
cited therein. The court, in the instant case, ruling that there was no implied federal
cause of action under the Housing Act, held there was no independent ground on
which to preserve plaintiffs' action. Absent a federal issue, declaratory judgment and
pendent jurisdiction also failed. Id. at 503.
Plaintiffs had presented as alternate bases for jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976), which grants original jurisdiction in all suits authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), which provides jurisdiction for civil actions aris-
ing under the Consitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, wherein the amount
in controversy exceeds $10,000. 486 F. Supp. at 500. The court rejected § 1331 juris-
diction, finding plaintiffs' claim did not come within due process protections, and
without discussion held § 1343(3) jurisdiction inadequate. Id. at 503. The quick dis-
missal of § 1343(3) appears at least questionable in light of the subsequent decision,
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not con-
strained to violations of civil rights laws but extends to any violation of federal law
under color of state law.
22. A cause of action is simply defined as the authority to institute a judicial pro-
ceeding to enforce some right or duty. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239
(1979). A cause of action differs from a "remedy" which is the means used to effectu-
ate a cause of action and "relief" which is the result obtained through the remedy. Id.
See also J. POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS §§ 452-54 (2d ed. 1883) and
Note, Implied Causes of Action;: A Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal
Common Law Power?, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 356 (1980). Causes of action nor-
mally have their basis in express language in a statute conferring the authority to
enforce statutory rights and duties. An implied cause of action may lie, absent ex-
press language, where a court determines the legislature intended the plaintiff to be
able to enforce their rights and duties. "Cause of action" should properly be distin-
1981)
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tion. Judicial inquiry focuses on whether or not Congress intended to
create such a remedial avenue.23 The principal area of dispute is the
extent to which the reviewing court may look beyond the language of
the statute and its legislative history to whether implication of a cause
of action would advance statutory purposes.24
A broad role for statutory purposes developed in early Supreme
Court implied cause of action cases.25 The Court's initial approach
guished from "right of action" but the basis for the distinction is not important here
and the terms shall be used interchangeably. See J. POMEROY, supra, at §§ 452-54.
23. See, e.g., Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) ("our
task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create a private
right of action"); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (vital to
whether an implied cause of action exists is whether Congress intended such an action
to be implied); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (inference of private cause of action must be consistent with
apparent legislative intent).
24. Cf., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 & 00 (1979)
(the Court criticizing the appeal to legislative purposes in prior decisions). See also
Touche, Ross & Co. v. Lewis, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) and Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 740 (1979) (Powell, J. dissenting).
25. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (discussed note 26 infra), repre-
sents the first modem statement of implied cause of action doctrine. See also Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (held a private cause of
action would be inconsistent with the structure and purposes of securities laws); Biv-
ens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (held Constitutional right to be free
from illegal search and seizure implies a right to sue for damages where plaintiff is the
victim of an illegal search); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (held
consistent with voting rights legislation to allow voter to sue state to ensure state does
not deny persons their right to vote); Wyandotte Transport Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 191 (1967) (where statute provides criminal penalties for deliberately sinking a
vessel, this does not preclude implied cause of action on part of federal government to
recover costs of salvage); Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under
Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judic-
ary?, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 441 (1974) (discussion of implied cause of action in the
circuit courts prior to Cort v. Ash).
Although prior to the Porak line of cases the Supreme Court found implied causes
of actions, the bases for the findings did not form a coherent doctrine. For a sampling
of the early implied right of action cases see, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241
U.S. 33 (1916) (widely considered the first implied cause of action case; the Supreme
Court held that "where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a per-
son, he shall have a remedy for the thing enacted for his advantage. . . ."); T.I.M.E.,
Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (although statute regulating freight rates
made illegal unjust and unreasonable rates, implication would be inconsistent with
the purposes of the act in granting enforcement to federal agency); Montana-Dakota
Utility Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (implication refused
where statute regulating utility rates made unlawful, unjust and unreasonable
charges); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (black railroad employ-
ees found to have cause of action against union under statute requiring union to bar-
(Vol. 22:249
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held a private right of action appropriate when it substantially aided
the regulatory mechanism in carrying forward the purposes of the
act.26 This test underwent refinement in the securities law case of
Cort v. Ash .27
In Cor, the Supreme Court ruled that the following four factors
would guide implied right of action analysis: (1) whether the plain-
tiff is a member of the class especially benefited by the statute;
(2) whether there is either an express or implicit indication of legisla-
tive intent to create or deny a right of action in that class; (3) whether
the finding of implication would be consistent with the legislation's
purposes; and (4) whether the subject matter is traditionally gov-
erned by state law such that federal interference would be
inappropriate.28
gain on behalf of the entire bargaining unit, where union refused to bargain on behalf
of black employees; Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (find-
ing implied cause of action in purchasers of securities under jurisdictional section of
statute for violation of substantive section containing no express authorization of pri-
vate suits).
26. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak, the Supreme Court
found an implied cause of action in plaintiff-stockholder to seek damages and invali-
dation of a merger between Case Company and another corporation effectuated by
false and misleading proxy solicitation in violation of section 14(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). The Court reasoned from the act
and legislative history that the statutory purpose was protection of investors. 377 U.S.
at 431-32. In addition the SEC, which was empowered to enforce the act through
administrative sanctions or criminal prosecutions, was overwhelmed by the vast
number of proxy statements submitted to it each year. Id. at 432. The Court held
that in carrying out the statute's policy, "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules
provides a necessary supplement to Commission action." Id But S( Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (distinguished Borak, noting
SEC was better able to administer requirements of Investor Protection Act than Se-
curities Exchange Act and implied cause of action would not be consistent with struc-
ture or purpose of statute).
27. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
28. Id. at 78. In Cori, a stockbroker brought suit on behalf of the corporation to
recover corporate funds spent on political advertisements in alleged violation of crim-
inal provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976). The
Supreme Court held the plaintiff did not meet the four-factor test.
First, the Court concluded that the purported act to benefit all citizens by lessening
the influence of large corporate expenditures on public elections; protection of stock-
holders at best constituted only a secondary concern. 422 U.S. at 80-81. Second, the
Court found no intent to create private actions in the legislative history. Id. at 83-84.
Third, private suits would not aid, and might hinder enforcement. Id. at 84. Fourth,
any civil action should be left to state corporation law. Id. at 84-85.
For a discussion of the impact of Cort v. Ash, see Note, Private Rights of Action
Under Amtrak andAsk Some Implicationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392
1981]
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Until the Supreme Court's recent reappraisal of the four-factor
test,2 9 application of the Cori formula led to predictable results. The
first factor of the Cort analysis operated as a general screening mech-
anism. Implication would result if the statute at issue primarily bene-
fited the public at large.3" Nor would courts imply a cause where the
plaintiff was not the intended beneficiary but merely shared with the
especially benefited class an interest in the proper administration of
the statutory scheme.3"
(1975) (analysis of development of implied cause of action doctrine and predictions of
future application); Note, Implied Private Rights of Action-hTe Cori v. Ash Test-
Interaction of "Especial genficiary" and Legislative Intent, 24 WAYNE L. RIV. 1173
(1976) (beneficiary status allows implication unless express language is found in legis-
lative history denying private action); Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal
Statutes-The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429
(1976) (critical discussion of Cort as too restrictive in its approach to implied rights of
action).
29. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche,
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
30. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81 (1975) (discussed in note 28 supra). See
also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979). "[T]his Court has
never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the statute explicitly
conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case."
On the other hand, it has been unreceptive to implication where the statute "create[s]
duties on the part of persons for the benefit of the public at large." Id. at 691 n.13.
31. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (Court declined
to find implied cause of action in unsuccessful tender offeror to overturn successful
tender offer by competitor made in violation of statute, finding plaintiff to be member
of regulated class and beneficiaries of statute to be investors); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (in a decision prior to Cort, held parties
merely affected by violations of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b),
could not benefit from implied cause of action but buyers and sellers of securities
could benefit).
For related cases in the area of public housing see, e.g., Roberts v. Cameron-Brown
Co., 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977) (held a cause of action cannot be implied in favor of
a publicly assisted mortgagor to challenge transfer by mortgagee of mortgage in viola-
tion of HUD handbook procedures, the court noting the handbook deals solely with
matters between HUD and the mortgagee); M.B. Guran Co., Inc. v. City of Akron,
546 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1976) (held low bidder who is not granted contract to construct
housing project cannot benefit from implied cause of action under Housing Act of
1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441, because the especially benefited class is composed only of
persons inhabiting inadequate housing); People's Housing Development Corp. v. City
of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (held a private contractor is not
the intended beneficiary of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5309, and thus cannot maintain an action for alleged racial mo-
tiviation by the city in terminating a rehabilitation project). Compare People's Hous-
ing with Martin Luther King Tenants Improvement Council v. Philadelphia Hous.
Auth., 15 EQ. Opp. Hous. (CCH) 942 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (finding tenants and prospec-
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The second factor served to bar implication only where express
language in the statute or its legislative historY evidenced considera-
tion and rejection of a private right of action.3 Congressional silence
as to whether an implied cause of action should exist militated in
favor of, rather than against, the plaintiff-beneficiary.33 Absent some
clear expression of intent to deny private redress, courts allowed the
second factor to merge into the third, viewing statutory purpose as
the guide to whether Congress intended to create a cause of action.34
Where a federal agency effectively protected the interests of statu-
tory beneficiaries, courts routinely found implication unnecessary to
the furtherance of legislative purposes.35 The existence of effective
tive residents of housing project can maintain an implied cause of action under the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5309, to chal-
lenge discrimination in project finding).
32. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (even though
plaintiffs are clear beneficiaries, the structure of the statutory scheme and legislative
history weighs against private action).
33. The Supreme Court basically reasoned that Congressional silence as to the
existence of private remedial rights does not necessarily evidence an intent to deny
such rights. (See discussion of the maxim of construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, in note 36 infra.) To the contrary, silence could fairly be interpreted as a
failure to expressly provide for private causes of action which Congress did not intend
to foreclose. This latter interpretation of Congressional silence tended to be favored
where implication of a private cause of action would coincide with statutory purposes
and the regulatory scheme. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). "[I]n situations in
which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not
necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit
purpose to deny such a cause of action would be controlling." Id. at 82 (emphasis in
original) (cited with approval in De Jesus Chavez v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 412 F.
Supp. 4, 6 (N.D. Tex. 1976)). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 694 (1979). "We must recognize. . . that legislative history of a statute that does
not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or am-
biguous on the question." Id.
34. Third factor analysis under Cort involves two inquiries: (I) are the remedies
created by statute adequate to effectuate the legislative purposes, and (2) would im-
plication of a private cause of action assist or frustrate the accomplishment of legisla-
tive goals. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). See also Martin Luther King
Tenant Improvement Council v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. 15 EQ. Opp. Hous. (CCH)
942 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (finding remedies available under the Housing and Community
Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5309(b) inadequate to enforce statutory provisions,
and that a private cause of action in tenants or prospective tenants of a housing pro-
ject would aid effectuation of statutory goals). For additional discussion of effective-
ness of legislative remedies see note 38 and accompanying text infra.
35. See, e.g., Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes
Comm'n, 588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1978) (beneficiaries of federal land preservation
statute cannot challenge government plan to alter land where agency is available to
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agency protection served as an implicit expression of congressional
intent to enforce obligations created under the statute through the
regulatory mechanism and not through private actions. 6 If, how-
ever, implication of a cause of action in members of the beneficiary
class would substantially further the purposes of the act, 37 courts
would normally infer legislative intent in favor of private actions.38
represent their interests); People's Housing Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F.
Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (where Congress vests enforcement responsibilities in a
government agency with expertise in the particular area courts are inclined to view
the grant of authority to the agency as exclusive; courts disfavor fragmented ap-
proaches to problems that may result where lower federal courts without expertise
respond to private actions). For a discussion of pre-Cart cases consistent with this
analysis see note 26 supra.
36. Under the maxim of construction expresso unius est excluslo alterius, where a
statute expressly provides for a particular remedy, there is an implication that the
legislature intended to exclude all other possible remedies. See J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 325-29 (1891).
Prior to Cart, the expressio unius est excluso alterus inference was operative unless
contradicted by "clear contrary evidence of legislative intent". National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). Cart re-
versed that inference, holding that where the legislation fails to provide for private
remedies but does provide public remedies, this fact alone should not stand in the way
of implication unless legislative history indicates the exclusivity of public remedies.
422 U.S. at 82-83. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711
(1979). But see Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n,
588 F.2d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the appropriateness of the
expressio unius maxim see Note, Private Rights of/cton Under 4mtrak and Ash:
Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392 (1975) (expressio unius
maxim is inappropriate as it ascribes an intent to Congress which is often false).
37. See note 30 supra.
38. Two considerations seem important as to whether or not courts will imply a
cause of action in beneficiaries to further statutory purposes where a regulatory or
enforcement mechanism exists: (1) the capabilities of the overseeing agency in effec-
tuating the statutory policy; and (2) the degree to which available statutory sanctions
are too severe to be used often or effectively in protecting beneficiary interests. With
regard to the former see, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. den/edsub noam. Harry Goodkin & Co. v. Abrahamson, 436 U.S. 905 (1978) and
436 U.S. 913 (1978).
According to the Second Circuit, courts should imply a cause of action under fed-
eral securities acts because "[a]bsent judicial recognition of private rights of action,
the federal securities laws most assuredly would fail to provide the effective regulation
over the securities industry which Congress intended." 568 F.2d at 872. Then quot-
ing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964), the Abrahamson court indicated
that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary
to make effective the Congressional purpose." 568 F.2d at 972. See also De Jesus
Chavez v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 412 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (holding intent of
Congress in enacting Higher Education Act of 1965, § 421, 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976), is
best achieved by allowing vigorous private actions brought by student borrowers be-
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If the plaintiff reached the fouth factor with his action still intact,
courts tended to find that the mere existence of a federal statute im-
posing rights and duties in a traditional state law area would suffice
to allow the plaintiff a federal forum.39
The first departure' from the Cort approach came in Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redinglon. In Redington, a trustee in bankruptcy brought
suit against an accounting firm for alleged violation of section 17(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.42 The trustee contended that
improperly audited and certified financial statements of an insolvent
brokerage firm prevented discovery of the firm's financial trouble in
time to protect the firm's customers. Addressing the first Cort factor,
the Supreme Court found that the section 17(a) requirement that bro-
kers keep records and file reports with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was merely a reporting mechanism to assist the
cause the Commissioner of education cannot prosecute every violation of interest sub-
sidy and loan guarantee provisions); and pre-Cort cases discussed note 26 supra.
With regard to the severity of administrative sancion consideration, see, e.g., Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, plaintiff brought a
damage action claiming she had been denied admission to the university's medical
school in violation of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (1976) which prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs receiving
federal funds. The Supreme Court found that plaintiff was a member of the espe-
cially benefited class in which Congress had established a right to be free from sex
discrimination. 441 U.S. at 694. The Court then concluded that since the only avail-
able administrative action, the withholding of federal funds under 20 U.S.C. § 1682
(1976), was so burdensome that it would not be appropriate when only isolated viola-
tions had occurred, private suits were necessary to see that federally created rights
were protected. 441 U.S. at 705-707. For a discussion of Cannon see, e.g., Comment,
Prisate Cause of Action Under Tide IX: Cannon v. University of Chicago, 20 URBAN
L. AN. 273 (1980).
39. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85 (1975) ("Violations arising under fed-
eral regulations are not 'traditionally' relegated to state law"). See also Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (held implication improper where interest sought
to be protected only tangentially relates to purpose of federal law and where adequate
state law remedies exist).
40. The first major expression of discontent with the Cori approach came in the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
717-49 (1979) (separate opinions).
41. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). For discussions of Redington, see Underwood, Tran-
samerica Mortgage Adisors Inc. v. Lewis: An Ana lsis of the Supreme Court's Delni-
tion of an Implied Right ofAction, 7 PEPPERDINE L. Rav. 533, 540-44 (1980); Note,
Implied Causes oAction: A Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal Common
Law Power?, 51 U. CoLo. L. Rnv. 355 (1980).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
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SEC in protecting investors.43 The section did not reflect an intent to
directly benefit plaintiffs class.' The Court distinguished cases find-
ing implied rights of action,45 which unlike Redington involved stat-
ues either prohibiting certain conduct or creating certain rights in
private parties.46
The Redington Court's major break with the Cort doctrine in-
volved the elevation of the second factor over the other three.47 The
Court held that where the statutory scheme of enforcement "clearly"
imports48 to deny a private right of action, silence on the issue in
legislative history weights against implication. 9 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, refused to examine the "necessity" of private
action in furthering the statute's purpose.50 The Justice ruled instead
that the third Cort factor served no useful purpose where the act pro-
hibited no conduct and created no personal rights.5 '
The Court carried the Redington analysis further in Transamerica
Investment Advisors v. Lewis.52 The Supreme Court in Transamerica
43. 442 U.S. at 569.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 569 (citiations omitted).
46. Id. at 569-7 1. Compare Redington with Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979), discussed in note 38 supra.
47. Id. at 575-76. The Court in Redington reasoned that whereas Cori established
four factors relevant to determination of whether implication should lie, Cori did not
establish that the factors were "entitled to equal weight." Rather, the inquiry should
focus on "the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history and its pur-
pose ... ." Id.
48. The Court speaks of the "plain language" of the statute but it is clear that
something less will suffice. Id. at 571.
49. Id. Compare cases discussed in note 33 and accompanying text supra.
50. Id. at 578 (phrasing the issue as one of strict statutory construction and "not
one of whether this Court thinks that it can imporve upon the statutory scheme that
Congress enacted into law"). See also note 47 supra.
51. Id. at 577. This phrasing seems to limit the reach of Redington and makes it
reconcilable with Cannon. For a discussion of this interpretation see Underwood,
Transamerica Mortgage 4dvisors, Inc. v. Lewis: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Defnition of an Implied Right ofAction, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 533, 543-44 (1980).
52. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). For discussions of Transamerica, see articles cited in note
41 supra. Since Transamerica, the Supreme Court decided several cases impacting on
the doctrines involved in implying private rights of actions. See Middlesex County
Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287
(1981); Northwestern Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO,
451 U.S. 77 (1981); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981);
Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981). In each case the
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declined to find an implied cause of action to recover damages53 in
the prime beneficiaries54 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.1'
Justice Stewart, writing for a bare majority, expressly rejected any
appeal to legislative purpose.5 6 Describing the issue solely as one of
statutory construction, Justice Stewart examined the Act's language
and found Congress created no private right in the beneficiary class
to seek a damage remedy."
The Advisors Act conferred power on the SEC to prosecute viola-
tions or impose administrative sanctions for breach of statutory du-
ties." This provision allowed the Court to deny a cause of action by
reviving a previously disregarded maxim: "When a statute limits a
thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any
other mode."59 As additional support the Court noted that compan-
ion legislation provided expressly for private actions.60 Congress also
deleted certain language allowing private relief from the investment
Court denied plaintiffs a cause of action under various statutes. The opinions indi-
cate, however, that the Court is not yet willing to apply the Redington-Transamerica
approach in all cases and would be willing to infer a private right of action in appro-
priate circumstances.
In Sierra Club, supra, five members of the Court reaffirmed the Cort test in its
entirety, despite a separate opinion filed by four justices arguing reliance on only the
second Cort factor and criticizing the majority's approach as a deviation from Reding-
ton and Transamerica. Additionally, in Sierra Club, as well a Universities Research,
supra, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the failure of the statute to designate a
specific class of statutory beneficiaries-the second Cort factor.
53. Plaintiff also sought and was allowed an implied right to rescind the invest-
ment contract, as the Court found that the legislative history and statutory use of the
word "void" favored implication. 444 U.S. at 19.
54. 444 U.S. at 24. Plaintiffs, shareholders in a real estate trust operated by de-
fendants, alleged that defendants committed fraudulent acts in violation of their
fiduciary duties. The Court, after surveying the statute and its legislative history, de-
termined that plaintiffs were members of the class of persons Congress sought to pro-
tect by passage of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. As a result of this finding,
Transamerica stands for extension of the Redington analysis into cases where the
plaintiffs are in fact members of the beneficiary class.
55. Section 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
56. Id. at 18.
57. Id. at 24.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
59. 444 U.S. at 20, citing Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929).
Cf. cases discussed in note 36 and accompanying text supra. Prior to Transamerica,
the Supreme Court had not invoked the expressia unius maxim since National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 441 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
60. 444 U.S. at 20-21.
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advisors bill before passage, thus indicating contemplation and rejec-
tion of such relief.6
The issue of implication under the United States Housing Act of
1937 surfaced in Boston Public Housing Tenants" Policy Council v,
Lynn 62 and Silva v. East Providence Housing Authority.63 Both cases
predate Redington-Transamerica. Boston Tenants arose out of facts
similar to those in Perry. Tenants of several low-income housing
projects brought suit to compel HUD and the local housing authority
to upgrade the quality of living conditions in the projectsr'4 A
United States District Court65 found no judicially enforceable duty in
HUD to insure that all federally funded projects be maintained in
"decent, safe, and sanitary condition., 66 Rather, the court found
only a duty to assist local authorities in remedying the "acute
shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings"; 67 project mainte-
nance itself was left to the local authority." Further, though the
ACC imposed certain maintenance obligations upon the housing au-
thority,69 the court held that tenants were not third party benefi-
ciaries, but only "incidental beneficiaries" to the contract. 70  The
61. Id. at 21-22.
62. 388 F. Supp. 493 (D. Mass. 1974).
63. 423 F. Supp. 453 (D. R.I. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 565 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir.
1977).
64. Plaintiffs' action was predicated on violation of the "decent, safe, and sani-
tary" clause in the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
65. The federal district court did not specifically rely on implication analysis in
denying plaintiffs relief. The court held plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge HUD
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). No privately enforce-
able duties existed in HUD, and no privately enforceable duties existed in the local
authority. Boston Pub. Hous. Tenants Policy Council, Inc. v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 493,
495-96 (D. Mass. 1974).
66. Id. at 495. See Ramos Perez v. United States, 594 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1979)
(HUD had no duty to insure that a housing project built under the United States
Housing Act was constructed so as to be safe for residents, even though HUD ap-
proved the project's design).
67. 388 F. Supp. at 495. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
68. 388 F. Supp. at 495-96. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
69. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
70. 388 F. Supp. at 496. The court reasoned that being the "ultimate benefi-
ciaries" under the ACC is not enough to make the tenants true "third-party benefi-
ciaries." See also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 509 (1st Cir. 1979)
(holding tenants are not the sole beneficiaries under the National Housing Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1715(d)(3) (1976), as Congress used the private sector to provide housing).
But see note 80 and accompanying text infra. The court in Boston Tenants also found
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tenants were thus powerless to enforce the terms of the ACC. The
appeals court concluded that if relief were to come it must come
through HUD action.7
In Silva,72 a federal district court applied the Cort test73 and
granted an implied cause of action under the United States Housing
Act.74 Silva involved a suit brought by prospective tenants of a fed-
erally subsidized low-income housing project." The plaintiffs sought
to enjoin delays in site selection and construction by the local author-
ity, alleging that the delays imperiled continuation of federal funding
to the project. 6
Reviewing the purposes of the Housing Act,77 Chief Judge Pettine
concluded that the intended beneficiaries were "low-income families
eligible for public housing. '78 Turning to the second Cort factor, the
court held that the absence of dispositive language in either the stat-
ute or its legislative history required examination of the act's reme-
that the authority was not required to implement recommendations in HUD circulars.
388 F. Supp. at 497.
71. Id. at 496-97. "HUD has the right or authority, but not the duty, to insure
that a local housing authority provides decent, safe, and sanitary housing." Id. at
496. But see Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (relied on in Silva,
note 72 infra) (holding plaintiffs seeking'low-cost hospital services under federal act
are not required to rely on a possible cut-off of federal funding by the overseeing
federal agency). See also Lcfcoe, HUD's Authorifty to Mandate Tenants Rights in Pub-
lic Housing, 80 YALE L.J. 463 (1971) (a general appraisal of the limits of HUD's
power under statute and the Constitution to protect tenant interests); Note, HUD's
Authority to Mandate Effective Management of Public Housing, 50 J. URB. L. 79 (1972)
(comment on and extension of Lefcoe's analysis).
72. 423 F. Supp. 453 (D. R.I. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 565 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir.
1977).
73. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
74. 423 F. Supp. at 465. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether
plaintiffs could bring this action as third-party beneficiaries of the ACC entered into
by HUD and the housing authority. Id.
75. Low-Rent Housing Act, §§ 1, 13(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1413(a) (1970) (current
version United States Housing Act of 1937 §§ 1437, 1437g (1976)).
76. HUD had already terminated the subsidy due to the local authority's failure
to diligently prosecute the project. Plaintiffs also challenged HUD's authority to end
funding. A federal district court had decided the action against HUD in plaintiff's
favor, but the First Circuit reversed on appeal. Silva v. East Providence Hous. Auth.,
565 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1977). The action against the housing authority is the only
part of the opinion relevant to this Comment.
77. 423 F. Supp. at 464. See notes 6, 7, 10 and accompanying text supra.
78. 423 F. Supp. at 464. Accord, Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. City of Durham, N.C.,
393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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dial structure.79 The court rejected application of the exclusionary
maxim later relied upon by the Transamerica Court.80 Instead, quot-
ing from Cort, the judge reasoned that since the plaintiffs' class had
certain statutory rights,8 plaintiffs need not show evidence of "an
intent to create a private cause of action" in the legislative history.82
Judge Pettine, addressing the Corl policy factor, held that afford-
ing a hearing to persons with considerable interest in the project
would further the purpose of alleviating the shortage of decent, low-
income housing.83 Moreover, allowing the suit to go forward would
not interfere with "discretionary managment decisions" of the hous-
ing authority84 or with administrative decisions of HUD.85 Under
the fourth Cort factor, the court held that in a situation involving
substantial issues of national housing policy a private right of action
does not impermissibly encroach on the domain of state law.
86
79. 423 F. Supp. at 464. But see Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 510 (1st
Cir. 1979).
80. 423 F. Supp. at 464. Where the act provided no limited private right of action,
there was no congressional intent to deny a broader private right of action even
though the statute established a public remedial mechanism. Id. See note 36 and
accompanying text supra. But see note 56 and accompanying text supra.
81. Id. See McQueen v. National Capital Hous. Auth., 366 A.2d 786, 793 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding Congress by the United States Housing Act created an "enti-
tlement" to a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling). But see note 67 and accompanying
text supra.
82. 423 F. Supp. at 464. The judge in Siva relied expressly on former Justice
Clark's opinion in Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (reasoning that a
civil remedy may be implied for persons clearly within the protective realm of legisla-
tion in the public interest even though the statute's language contains no explicit indi-
cation that statutory beneficiaries possess a right to enforce the statute's provisions).
For other cases finding implied causes of actions under the ratinale of Euresti in the
statutory beneficiaries of welfare legislation see, e.g., Saine v. Hospital Auth, of Hall
County, 502 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1974); New York City Coalition for Community
Health v. Lindsay, 362 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
83. 423 F. Supp. at 465.
84. Id. The court distinguished Boston Tenants (discussed notes 64-71 and ac-
companying text, supra), stating plaintiffs in Siva are not second guessing discretion-
ary managerial decisions, but are armed with the ACC which spells out specific
obligations of the housing authority. See also note 8 and accompanying text, supra.
The Silva court appears less than forthright in its effort to distinguish Boston Tenants.
The court did not provide a basis for treating ACC imposed construction procedures
differently from ACC required maintenance provisions, and the court's language in
general seems to cut directly against Boston Tenants.
85. 423 F. Supp. at 456.
86. Id. See also note 39 and accompanying text, supra.
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Perry v. Housing Authority87 arose out of this backgound. Chief
Judge Hemphil's opinion in Perry paid lip service to the four factor
test of Cort v. Ash,88 and also, without noting the limitations of Tran-
samerica,"9 adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case as a
guide.9' The decision focused exclusively on the first two Cort fac-
tors. Judge Hemphill reasoned that the Housing Act's eligibility re-
quirements limited the statutory beneficiaries to an ascertainable
group of which plaintiffs were members.9 Although the plaintiffs
met the first part of the test, the court found no statutory language
sufficiently concrete to establish congressional intent to allow private
actions. 2
The failure of Judge Hemphill to read Transamerica in light of the
general line of implication cases,93 as well as those involving the
United States Housing Act,94 led to substantial flaws in his opinion.
Any discussion of implication must begin from the accepted premise
that a cause of action involves the power to institute a judicial pro-
ceeding to enforce some right.95 Injury alone cannot give rise to a
87. 486 F. Supp. 498 (D. S.C. 1980).
88. Id. at 502.
89. See note 52 and accompanying text supra. Compare the discussion of Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 453 (1974) at note 38 and accompanying text supra.
90 486 F. Supp. at 502.
91. Id.
92. Id. The district court found the policy statement in 42 U.S.C. § 1437 "too
amorphous" to create a private right of action. The court also found reason to em-
ploy the expressio unius maxim (discussed notes 36 and 59 and accompanying text
supra). The court asserted that Congress impliedly excluded private remedies by al-
lowing HUD to terminate subsidies under 42 U.S.C. § 1437(g), for substantial
breaches of the ACC. 486 F. Supp. at 502.
93. See notes 98-99 infra.
94. See notes 62-86 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note 21 supra. Recently, in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court overturned a decision in the Third Circuit which
found an implied cause of action under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance &
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-81 (1976) in favor of mentally ill residents of a
state institution. The residents sought to compel the institution to comply with provi-
sions of the Act relating to quality of treatment and residential life. The Supreme
Court held that these provisions did not impose requirements on the state but were
merely "goals"-indications of desired treatment. Justice Rehnquist reasoned for the
majority, that if Congress desired to impose upon the states the heavy costs of the
Act's treatment and residential programs, Congress would have stated so expressly.
Thus in HaIderman the private plaintiffs--and presumably the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, who was charged with enforcement of the Act-had no statu-
tory rights or requirements to enforce.
19811
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
cause of action.96 Without explicitly saying so, the Supreme Court
resolves implication cases with reference to the type of rights in-
volved.9 7 Where a statute creates a direct right in both a definable
beneficiary class and the overseeing federal agency, courts have uni-
formly found an implied cause of action in members of the class
under a traditional Cort approach.9" Where the statute creates a
right to certain performance in the overseeing agency for the benefit
of a defined class of persons, but not directly in the class, the analysis
becomes more complex.99 Redinglon would seem to refuse implica-
tion in the latter type of case unless congressional language indicates
96. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
97. Statutes which impose a duty on a party to act or not to act in a certain way
necessarily involve a correlative right in some other party to performance of that duty.
See J. POMEROY, REMEDIES & REMEDIAL RIGHTS, § 453 (2d ed. 1883). In all impli-
cation cases a right is created in a federal agency to enforce duties and obligations
imposed by statute. Although not commanded by statute a right to the performance
may run to the statutory beneficiaries by implication. The questions to be resolved in
each case are (1) whether the right is created in both the federal agency and the bene-
ficiary class; and (2) if not, whether members of the beneficiary class may succeed to
the agency's right of action as third party beneficiaries, or must instead passively
await administrative action.
98. Implied right of action cases appear to break into two lines of precedent. One
line is composed of those cases where a right is created in the beneficiary class and the
other is composed of those cases where no right is created directly in the beneficiary
class but a policy is established by statute which benefits the class. The latter group-
ing of cases is discussed in note 99 infra.
The former line of cases consists of those cases involving a statutorily created civil
right in members of the beneficiary class. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979) (discussed notes 38 supra & 103 infra). The circuit courts have
also included in this grouping cases involving statutory grants of welfare-type benefits
to members of the beneficiary class. See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (5th
Cir. 1974) (discussed note 71 supra). See also Note, Implied Federal Rights ofAction
andthe Migrant Farm worker, 44 U. COLo. L. Rnv. 237 (1972) (courts should provide
remedies for "existing rights" where available remedies are inadequate; such findings
by courts do not interfere with legislative programs but supplement the programs);
Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Ci'il Rights." The Case for a Sympathetic
View, 87 YALE L. J. 1378 (1978) (outline of the "proper" application of Cort factors to
cases raising civil rights issues).
99. Traditional regulatory statutes are generally involved in the second, and more
traditional line, of implied cause of action cases. See note 98. Compare cases dis-
cussed in note 96 supra. Cases which arise out of statutes prohibiting certain conduct
but not creating civil rights or conferring welfare grants fall under the analysis of Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (discussed at notes 31-39 and accompanying text supra), as
modified by Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) and Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979). See notes 41-61 and accompanying text
supra).
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a private cause of action.l" °
The district court in Perry should have begun by determining not
only whether plaintiffs were members of a beneficiary class,10° but
also whether that class possesses a right to "decent, safe, and sani-
tary" housing." 2 Though some case law indicates otherwise, 0" at
least one court has found that the United States Housing Act vests
tenants with a statutory right to fit housing."° Such a finding in
Perry would have allowed the court to essentially by-pass the second
Cort factor,' 0 5 and appeal to the remedial scheme and to whether
private actions would further the Act's purpose as required by the
third Cort factor1 °6 Failure to so determine leaves no proper basis
100. Redington inverts the approach taken in prior cases utilizing the Cart test.
Before Redington, courts interpreted the second factor as an inquiry whether Con-
gress expressed an intent to deny a private right of action, not whether Congress ex-
pressed an intent to grant such an action. See, e.g., Jenkins v. S & A Chaissan &
Sons, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 216 (D.C. N.Y. 1978) and note 33 supra.
101. 486 F. Supp. at 502. "Since the eligibility requirements of the statute limit
the recipients to a precisely, ascertainable group, plaintiffs meet the first test." Id.
102. See note 97 supra. The threshold question of whether or not a statutory right
exists must be answered before a court can proceed to determine whether or not Con-
gress intended a private right of action. The Perry court in addressing a due process
issue raised by the plaintiffs reaffirmed a well established position that there is no
constitutional right to housing decent or otherwise. 486 F. Supp. at 503. The court
did not address, however, whether once a party is a participant in a federal housing
program, that party acquires some sort of statutory property right in the housing. See
note 105 infra.
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981), discussed in note 95 upra, indicates that where a reviewing court is
faced with a statutory provision that would require a state agency to undertake a large
expenditure such as the "decent, safe, and sanitary" language of the United States
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976), that language may be construed as a mere goal
and not as imposing a requirement upon the state. 451 U.S. at 11-18.
103. See, e.g., Potrero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Auth. City &
County of San Francisco, 410 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding tenants of a
public housing project possess no rights as a group under the statute but possess only
those rights as individual tenants stemming from leases with the local housing
authority).
104. Silva v. East Providence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 464 (1976). In find-
ing no need to inquire into the second Cort factor, the Silva court quoted Cart, "'in
situations in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons certain
rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action
.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975)).
105. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
106. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
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for applying the Redingon-Transamerica test.' 0 7
Case law indicates that whereas HUD has a right to enforce provi-
sions of the Act or the ACC, HUD has no obligation to do so.'0 8 As
a result, if a federal court denies private right of action, tenants would
have only potential relief-relief dependent on discretionary HUD
action. Yet in a case analogous to Perry, the Fifth Circuit held that
members of a beneficiary class need not await possible administrative
action to enforce rights created in the class by federal statute.' 0 9
HUD has available only one sanction for breaches of duty by the
local authority-a HUD takeover of the project. Considering the se-
verity of such a sanction and the burdens it would place upon HUD
and the project residents, a HUD takeover seems improbable as an
alternative.' 0 Thus, private action would assist and not hinder HUD
in protecting those rights under its charge.' Equally important, pri-
vate actions would not interfere with managerial discretion reserved
to the local authority because the ACC imposes specific and judi-
107. See note 90 and accompanying text supra. The judge failed to consider the
limitations of Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) and Transamer-
ica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), in applying the strict con-
struction approach of Transamerica. In Redington the Court limited its holding by
noting that an appeal to statutory purposes was appropriate where the statute created
personal rights in members of the beneficiary class. See note 51 and accompanying
text supra. In addition, the application of the expresslo unius maxim of construction
and the disregard of statutory purposes in Transamerica only makes sense in light of
the above quoted language from Redington and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979) (discussed in note 38 supra) if the reviewing court determines that the
statute was merely enacted to benefit some group of persons that conferred no sub-
stantive right in group members to the benefit. Although Cannon involves a civil
rights claim, the case's reach appears broader. The Supreme Court reasoned that it
had never withheld a private remedy "where the statutes explicitly conferred a benefit
on a class of persons" and where those persons were not assured of the "ability to
activate and participate in the administrative process contemplated by the statute."
441 U.S. at 706 n.40.
108. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
109. See Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussed note 71
supra). This aspect of Euresil was expressly adopted by the court in Silva v. East
Providence Hous. Auth., 423 F. Supp. 453, 465 (D.R.I. 1976) rev'd on other grounds
565 F.2d 1217 (Ist Cir. 1977) (discussed notes 74-86 and accompanying text supra).
See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
110. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 705-707 (1979) discussed
in note 38 supra. The fact that Cannon was decided only one month before Rednglon
and was extensively relied on in both Redington and Transamerica indicates that the
Cannon approach is still good law.
111. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
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cially enforceable obligations on the authority. 1 2
Although the Redington-Transamerica decisions clearly hold that
beneficiary status alone cannot support the finding of an implied pri-
vate right of action, these decisions should not stand in the way of
implication where intended beneficiaries of a legislative scheme as-
sert a statutory right.
Mark Packer
112. See notes 10 and 84 and accompanying text supra.
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol22/iss1/8
